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Introduction
When I was growing up in the South, me being gay meant me going to Hell. That
was one of the main reasons I started learning Chinese – Escape. But when I reached
Shanghai, I realized it wasn’t as much as an escape as I hoped it would be; I still didn’t
run into a single other gay person and I still didn’t feel comfortable being “out.” So, that
was my motivation for researching this topic – If it doesn’t mean being condemned to
Hell, but it doesn’t mean being able to express my (“deviant”) sexuality, what, exactly,
does it mean to be gay in China?
When I first read about a “global gay identity” theory in Dennis Altman’s “Global
Gaze/Global gays”, I was confused. I knew it was “bad” to give in to the idea that
“everyone” wants to be like the West, but I also agreed with virtually everything about
the theory. I agreed with the idea of a universal sexual identity that could be detached
from context and other identities, that every gay person could understand what “being
gay” means and the homophobia “we” collectively faced. In Shanghai, it seemed like
most people’s English was better than my Chinese, to the point they could quote Big
Bang Theory on demand. When I read about family struggles that were universal, for
example, it made sense – Sure, much more emphasis is placed on family values in China,
but surely certain aspects of the family would eventually “ease up” to “allow” gay people
in. I knew I was doing something “bad,” committing some kind of “mistake,” but I
couldn’t help but envision a future of China that included rainbow flags, gay pride
parades, and uncloseted homosexuality when I read about a global gay identity.
Although I knew even at that time that I was committing some grave error in
thinking that this was the reality of the world – that the West is some beacon of light and
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hope that “dark” and “lost” nations like China could look up to for guidance, but I
couldn’t trace my reasoning back to some point of inaccuracy that was misguiding me.
Now I understand the range of assumptions Altman and I were both making that led us to
the faulty conclusion that is a “global gay identity,” assumptions so deeply embedded in
Western society that they are often not recognized even when they are directly pointed
out.
First and foremost, I realized many of these assumptions related back to identity
politics. Given the recent proliferation of identity politics and its foundation in Western
ideology, the formation of an identity based on sexuality, gender, race, etc. appears to the
Western eye as if it is a universal and naturally-occurring phenomenon. Assumptions
made on this basic premise, coupled with colonial biases related to the homogenizing and
assimilating nature of globalization, have given way to theories about globalized
identities. With specific regards to (homo)sexuality, the “global gay identity” is one such
theory (Altman 1997).
Certain investments preclude the development of such a theory. First is the idea
that sexual identity can be separated not only from other (often competing) identities, but
even from the historical and social context in which it emerged. This viewpoint,
legitimized by the essentializing forces on which Western identity politics movements
have been founded and have depended, presents sexual identity as if it is a universal truth
that can be reliably analyzed in a vacuum. Assumptions about the nature of globalization,
that it is simply the replacement of non-Western culture with that of Western culture,
have been used in further validating such a claim.
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Much effort has been made in disproving such theory. Researchers have focused
on a range of different cultures and societies, typically those found in Southeast Asia, in
order to point out major differences between gay identity found in these non-Western
cultures compared to their Western counterpart (Manalansan 2007; Sim 2005; Yau 2010).
This is the case for much of research focused on gay identity in China, and this focus has
produced conclusions that present Chinese gay identity as being totally unique from
Western gay identity (Chou 2001). Despite the merit of this research in bringing attention
to the cultural specificities that characterize modern Chinese gay identity, its major
shortcoming is that it neglects the role that globalization has played in “reconfiguring”
non-Western identity (Rofel 2007).
In response to both of these images, even more research has been produced that
conveys an image of a transnational Chinese gay identity that interacts with, but is not
determined by, effects of globalization (Kong 2011, 2016; Rofel 2007; Liu 2010, 2015;
Martin 2007; Ho 2011). This research includes attention to the effects of globalization,
present in theory supporting a global gay identity, as well as the influence of Chinese
culture that is present in theory supporting a unique and separate Chinese gay identity.
They do not operate on the pretense of a coherent, unified (whether localized or
globalized) identity; rather, they provide representations of a gay identity created in the
inherently incoherent and fragmented nature of the postmodern world. Yet, even though
many of these studies have been produced in quite recent times, there has been a recent
flooding of new information, events, etc. related to homosexuality in China, a flooding
which sometimes challenges the coherence of certain arguments produced by these
researchers.
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With these factors in mind, I review the history of Western (sexual) identity and
the context in which it developed. I do so because assumptions about identity, identity
politics, homonormativity, and their universal intelligibility are the root from which other
improper assumptions are made and further inaccurate conclusions are reached. What
causes Westerners to claim certain identities, and why does it feel natural to do so? What
factors characterize(d) Western (sexual) identity development? How have these factors
influenced modern conceptions of (sexual) identity in the West?
Another essential component of my analysis is the unique history of
homosexuality in China, the position and overarching role of sexuality and the meanings
attached to it, and the emergence of sexual identity in China. I explain the impact
resulting from the following factors: China’s varying social climate on homosexuality;
the recent regime changes and ideological shifts that have occurred in China during the
past century; and influence from Western cultural hegemony. This analysis, combined
with an understanding of Western (sexual) identity, serves as a challenge to the
eurocentrism commonly found in depictions of Chinese gay identity. How long has
(homo)sexual identity existed in China? When, why, how and with what connotations did
it emerge? What does it mean to Chinese society?
After deconstructing the eurocentric and colonial assumptions and investments
commonly embedded in themes related to the nature and function of identity, sexuality,
and globalization (among others), I consider the many overarching factors and forces that
characterize and define gay identity in the context of postsocialist China. These factors
are consolidated into three groups for analysis: The individual and the family situated in
the context of the often-converging forces of neoliberal expansion and Chinese morality,
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the role of the government, and emergent forces of homosexuality
localization/indigenization.
I ultimately provide an image of Chinese gay identity as multiplicitous,
heterogeneous and fragmented. This image captures its incoherent foundations, the
conflicting and often contradictory social and cultural forces that directly and indirectly
characterize and influence it, and the range of inconsistent and varying contexts in which
personal meaning is created and attached to it. This image is both a conglomeration and a
snapshot – It tries to make sense of an identity during a time that precedes and is
preceded by chaotic and rapid change on a global and local scale; it incorporates a
patchwork of theories, observations, and anecdotes in order to form connections between
seemingly disconnected themes. This project collages fragmented images into a singular
frame, frozen in time, seeking to provide a moment of clarity contained within an ever
converging, mutating, and dissociating landscape.
Literature review
Dennis Altman - “Global Gaze/Global Gays”
Dennis Altman frames his central argument as the following:
In much of urban Asia it is easy to see parallels with the West of several decades
ago: existing ideas of male homosexuals as would-be women are being replaced
by the assertion of new self-concepts; more men are attracted to the idea of
primary homosexual relationships, rather than marrying and engaging in
“homosex” on the side; there is a development of more commercial venues...in
both organizations and media there is the emergence of a gay political
consciousness (423).
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This argument begins simply enough. Although I am skeptical about how accurate
it is for the stereotyping of “male homosexuals as would-be women” to be applied
universally, but otherwise, the connections seem relatively vague enough to be placed in
a global context. As he continues his analysis, several problematic statements arise. I
address the following in my paper:
First, “In a world where more and more cultural styles are imported and
assimilated there seems no reason why a western-style gayness should not prove as
attractive as other western identities” (420). This is a rather straightforwardly colonial
statement that assumes all cultures want to express themselves through Western means,
which, given the very actions of “western-style gayness” – individualistic and often
confrontational – does not make sense in the context of Chinese culture.
Second, “Michael Tan and others have suggested that the absence of the sort of
hostility towards homosexuality found in Anglo-Saxon societies may also retard the
development of gay political movements” (426-7). This implies that all cultures require
or desire a gay political movement and that the only path for increased rights is through
reaction to violence, both of which I will strongly question.
Third, “In the past two decades there has emerged a definable group of selfidentified homosexuals...who see themselves as part of a global community, whose
commonalities override but do not deny those of race and nationality” (424). In the
context of China, there appears to be the inverse happening, with cultural/national
commonalities overriding that of sexual commonalities.
Fourth, “The claiming of lesbian/gay identities in Asia or Latin America is as
much about being western as about sexuality, symbolized by the co-option of the word
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“gay” into [several languages]” (430). I will use concepts such as cultural consciousness,
indigenous linguistics, and cosmopolitanism to show why this is not the case.
Finally, “It is tempting to accept the Confucian and other Asian discourses about
the significance of the family, and forget that similar experiences are very common for
homosexuals in most countries...Yes, homosexuals in Asian cities are still likely to be
more integrated into family roles and expectations than would be true in [Western cities].
But we are speaking here for graduations, not absolute differences” (423). A major
portion of this paper is involved with showing how, despite ubiquity of “family
struggles” themselves, these should not be viewed as “graduations” because the function
of the family is inherently different.
Michel Foucault and Western Sexuality
The aspect of Western sexuality and gay identity most relevant to this paper is the
eurocentric assumptions about their universality. First, I reference Michel Foucault’s
History of Sexuality and his theory of scientia sexualis to question the “naturalness” with
which sexual identity is seen to be claimed and the “organic” emergence of the
hetero/homo sexual binary. In challenging common eurocentric assumptions, I hope to
present images of sexuality, the sexual binary, and sexual identity that are less natural
than they may seem.
Michel Foucault’s History of Sexuality is essential in understanding the historical
context of Western sexual identity. Most importantly, Foucault describes what is known
as “scientia sexualis,” a uniquely Western approach to understanding sexuality that
involves the molding the findings of “scientific” discourse of (homo)sexuality in a way
that fits Christian themes, namely the “confessional” nature of sexuality (67-8).
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He makes two important arguments about scientia sexualis: First, that the hetero/homosexual binary, a concept that will be incredibly important throughout this paper,
was created within the context of Western scientia sexualis; second, that “homosexuality”
did not organically come into existence in the form of an identity, but rather that sexual
identity itself came into existence specifically in Western culture through persecution of
homosexuality; third, that homosexuality is not the result of “essentialized biological
differences,” but rather genealogy of homophobic oppression (Foucault 53) – yet, in the
emergence of identity politics, members of the gay rights movement rallied around the
idea that they were “born this way,” a (scientifically unproven) theme that continues
today. The conclusions drawn here are relevant to this thesis in that they show how what
Western society perceives to be a universal truth – sexuality and sexual identity – has
actually been created in a very specific context.
Identity Politics
Cressida Heyes describes identity politics as such:
The laden phrase ‘identity politics’ has come to signify a wide range of political
activity and theorizing founded in the shared experiences of injustice of members
of certain social groups. Rather than organizing solely around belief systems,
programmatic manifestos, or party affiliation, identity political formations
typically aim to secure the political freedom of a specific constituency
marginalized within its larger context. Members of that constituency assert or
reclaim ways of understanding their distinctiveness that challenge dominant
oppressive characterizations, with the goal of greater self-determination (2002).
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Identity is not something that is claimed naturally or automatically by a group.
For example, white people in the West rarely feel a need to “claim” their racial or cultural
identity. In that same vein, Western gay identity and group “consciousness” around that
identity was not created by their common sexuality alone. If common sexuality was the
only “ingredient” in a cohesive and universal sexual identity, then the Western nonheterosexual community would not be divided into the “gay” and “queer” camps, for
example.
In America’s equal rights movements, including the civil rights movement,
women’s rights movement, and gay rights movement, identity politics has been employed
as a means of empowering a marginalized group of people through collective reclamation
of an identity that was originally defined and manipulated by a dominant group. These
new identities are reactionary – alluding to Foucault’s “reverse affirmation” (1992) – and
are developed in direct response to systemic oppression.
Ultimately, Western gay identity is a political one, resulting not from human
nature but rather in direct opposition to the injustice sustained by social inequality.
Identity politics tactics are an effective vehicle for social change because they create a
cohesive group that simultaneously provides individuals with protection against violence
and oppression and produces a sense of solidarity and morale. They are also often
problematic because they create an identity that only includes one singular aspect of the
self, i.e. race, gender, sexuality yet still make claims to supposedly represent a group
composed of people from a range of different races, classes, and location.
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Heteronormativity and Homonormativity
These two concepts are instrumental in the development of both Western gay
identity and non-Western forms of gay identity. Lovaas and Jenkins say the following on
“heteronormativity”:
By heteronormativity, I mean the principles of order and control that position
heterosexuality as the cornerstone of the American sex/gender system and
obligate the personal construction of sexuality and gender in terms of
heterosexual norms. Heteronormativity assumes, for example, that there are two
sexes and therefore two genders. Heteronormativity then requires that all
discussions of gendered identity and opportunity be framed strictly in terms of
this dichotomy (2007: 98).
From this quote, it can be seen that dominant sexual groups (i.e. heterosexuals)
gain power from heteronormativity not only through heterosexual/homosexual binary but
also through the heterosexist institutions, i.e. monogamous marriage, that instigates it.
Yet, in the American gay rights movement’s fight for equality, heteronormativity and its
related institutions remained unchallenged or can even strengthened (i.e. through gay
marriage legalization).
Homonormativity rests in non-heterosexuals’ acquiescence to (or, as is frequently
the case, their approval of) these heterosexist phenomena. In Heteronormativity and
Homonormativity as Practical and Moral Resources, Dana Rosenfeld describes this
phenomenon:
Studies of heteronormativity have emphasized its normative content and
repressive functions, but few have considered the strategic use of heteronormative
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and homonormative precepts to shape sexual selves, public identities, and social
relations...Viewed through a homonormative lens, heteronormativity provided the
tools for personal survival in a hostile society and for the collective production of
a respectable homosexual culture. Informants’ strategic use of heteronormativity
can help explain heteronormativity’s survival despite the incoherence and fragility
of its content (2009: 617).
Furthermore, Mark Stern correctly states that homonormativity “elevates
particular identities and normative behaviors” within the gay community; implicit in this
elevation of certain (dominant) identities is the suppression of comparatively
marginalized identities (2015: 171-2). This intra-community status disparity produces the
“good gay/bad gay” dichotomy (Lipton 2014; Rofes 1998: 144) that seeks to divide its
members along lines of competing identities even as identity politics rhetoric “confirms”
their solidarity.
Intersectionality, Black Struggle, Cultural Consciousness
A major premise of global gay identity theory, as described in Altman’s “Global
Gaze/Global Gays”, is the existence of a political “global community” or consciousness
for gays, “whose commonalities override but do not deny those of race and nationality”
(1997: 424). This approach to sexual identity not only suggests the Western context that
frames it is universally intelligible – i.e. there is a universal and uniform oppression of
homosexuality that a politicized and globalized “gay community” has formed around –
but also that this sexual identity is “placed before” other identities. To explore the
validity of this claim, I employ the theory of “intersectionality” and its application in
conceptualizing “Black struggle” and cultural consciousness.
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Intersectionality theory, coined by Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, a woman of
color, refers to the need for mutual respect and regard for Black and feminist movements.
Explanation of intersectionality often includes the following quote from Crenshaw:
“When feminism does not explicitly oppose racism, and when anti-racism does not
incorporate opposition to patriarchy, race and gender politics often end up being
antagonistic to each other and both interests lose” (1996: 827).
Although the term was developed in the context of the civil rights and feminist
movements, it is still especially relevant to Western gay identity (developed through the
gay rights movement) because all three of these movements share the use of identity
politics that primarily relies on shared experiences of oppression – which is the
“political” aspect of “global” “gay consciousness” that Altman refers to. Unlike Altman’s
global gay theory, this call for intersectionality suggests that oppression is not a kind of
“mosaic” that can be “dissected” and neatly separated into categories; rather, it claims
that oppression is a holistic phenomenon, with its sources (identities) blended together
unevenly.
In reference to an “uneven” blending of identities, I present the concept of “Black
struggle” to show the potential for “prioritization” of other identities over that of sexual
identity. Black struggle, which is used in Darnell Moore’s “An Interrogation of the Black
Presence in the Queer Project”, suggests that Black identity must be prioritized – but
should not be considered entirely exclusive of – over other forms of identity because
other movements are inherently non-inclusive of Black identity (2011: 163-6). This is
relevant to gay identity because, whereas Altman suggests a universal “override” of
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racial/national/cultural identity by sexual identity, this is a specific example of the
opposite, an example that exists within Western society itself.
In On China’s Cultural Transformation, Yu Keping describes a shift in China’s
approach to traditional culture during modernization: First, there was a “cultural debate”
in which traditional culture was criticized (with the “superiority” of Western culture
being the source of its criticism); this was (is) followed by the “revival of Chinese
culture” (2016: 4). According to Yu, this revival is based on two premises: First, that “the
flourishing of Chinese culture and the prosperity of the Chinese people are directly
linked” and that “the destiny of Chinese culture and the destiny of Chinese people are, for
better or worse, linked”; second, that “Chinese culture is innately superior to Western
culture” (6-7).
Renewed focus on the traditional elements of an increasingly transnational
Chinese culture is reflected in the term “cultural consciousness,” which was coined in
1997 by 费孝通 (Fei Xiaotong), one of China’s most prominent researchers ever in the
fields of sociology and anthropology and author of 《乡土中国》(From the Soil), an
incredibly well-known book in China which describes Chinese society’s moral
framework (费孝通 1947; Yu 2016: 10). Postmodern anxieties in contemporary China
(Anagnost 2004; Rofel 2007) are the epitome of the call for cultural consciousness: As
nations reach a more and more equal level of economic development, social development
is predicted to be (and, thus far, has appeared to be) the major determining factor of a
nation’s competitive ability (Yu 2016: 10-13). Given this scenario, cultural consciousness
is an obvious necessity in securing China’s position of superiority in the twenty-first
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century; surely, this reemphasized cultural/ethnic identity has far-reaching impact on
sexual identity in China.
Postsocialist Government – Neoliberalism and Suzhi Discourse
After the period of Maoism, postsocialist China, with its open market, increased
privatization, decreased government control, and increased individual freedoms (Rofel
2007; Kipnis 2007) is often considered to be in a state of neoliberalism similar to that
commonly found in the West. Yet, in its development of a “socialist spiritual civilization”
(Bai 2014: 39), the government has retained a large degree of influence in shaping the
lives of its citizens. The government permeates the social sphere and exerts its influence
through “suzhi discourse” (Rofel 2007; Anagnost 2004; Kipnis 2007; Hsu 2006; Bray and
Jeffreys 2017; Yu 2016; 上海民政 2016).
Anagnost contextualizes suzhi discourse:
In the movement from a planned to a market economy, the representation of value
has undergone a reorganization in the realm of the biopolitical in which human
life becomes a new frontier for capital accumulation. This changing relationship
between value and bodies is encompassed by the term suzhi, which roughly
translates into English as “quality”...Anxieties about the low quality of the
Chinese people entered into the culture fever (wenhua re) of the late 1980s, in
which intellectuals debated the cultural impediments to modernization...[By the
early 1990s,] as economic reforms increased privatization and dismantled the
institutions and entitlements of state socialism, suzhi appeared in new discourses
of social distinction and the discursive production of middle classness (189-190).
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Kipnis claims that the major difference between Western and Chinese
“neoliberalism” is that, unlike “Reagan-esque” neoliberalism, with its “blame the victim”
mentality that redirects the blame of inequalities from the government back to the
individual themself, in the Chinese “neoliberal” system, structural inequalities are
justified by the state (2007: 388-9). He even refers to the Chinese system as “antiliberal,” comparing it to (a much less extreme version of) the Indian caste system (390-1).
Kipnis provides an example that clarifies such similarities between the two systems
(specifically their social immobility) by analyzing the work of Carolyn Hsu in Harbin:
The difference [between getihu and shangren] is often conceived in terms of
suzhi, defined primarily in relation to educational attainment. No matter how
much money they made, getihu were imagined as peasant traders with both low
levels of education and questionable morality. No matter how little money they
made (or how much they lost), college graduates who attempted to start
businesses were conceived of as high suzhi shangren of considerable moral status
(391; Hsu 2004).
Suzhi is an abstract (and political) concept – Everyone is born with a certain
potential, a suzhi “ceiling”, and it is up to the individual themself to reach the top of that
ceiling; suzhi can seemingly be applied to most everything, and there is not necessarily a
consensus on what it should and should not be applied to. Although the meaning and
usage of suzhi is often not unanimous, a theme that is repeated across discourse of suzhi
is that the socioeconomic class discrepancy between the low-class migrant worker and
the upper-/middle-class (single child) urbanite serves as a reification of the high/low
suzhi binary. Ann Anagnost specifically describes this reification: “The discourse of

Lynam 17

suzhi appears most elaborated in relation to two figures: the body of the rural migrant,
which exemplifies suzhi in its apparent absence, and the body of the urban, middle-class
only child, which is fetishized as a site for the accumulation of the very dimensions of
suzhi wanting in its ‘other’” (2004: 190).
As earlier, Kipnis describes the “justified” nature of migrant workers’ low suzhi
capacity in reference to suzhi discourse’s anti-liberal nature: “Very few urbanites would
suggest that the 'peasants' do not try hard enough or do not work hard enough. Rather, the
implications are that no matter how hard they try...they will never overcome their peasant
lack of quality” (2007: 389). In both of these examples, the urbanite is labelled as the
central site for desire – its existence, pursuit, and fulfillment.
Focusing on suzhi’s implications for gay identity, Loretta Ho expands the focus of
suzhi beyond the migrant worker and urban single child: “This invisible, and yet
extensive, power of suzhi is simultaneously attached to discourse on morality...This
moral concern is specific to China’s commitment to the attainment of cultural capital,
with emphasis on the development of people’s suzhi – for example, cultural quality
(wenhua suzhi), psychological quality (xinli suzhi), quality of consciousness (sixiang
suzhi), and quality of morality (daode suzhi) (2008: 93).
Haiqing Yu also refers to Ho’s suzhi analysis, but shifts the focus to marginalized
peoples, alluding to the heteronormativity implicit in suzhi discourse along the way:
[Poverty, disease, and marginalization] are associated with individual failure in
educational, cultural, and financial attainment...Such failure, in turn, as the logic
of suzhi discourse goes, leads to ‘bad’ choices in personal behavior. This kind of
logic is applied not only to migrant workers, but also to the ‘less desirable’
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urbanites such as...men who have sex with men. Similarly, men who have sex
with men, homosexuals, and money boys [gay rural sex workers] are often
stigmatized for their non-normative sexual behavior...These marginalized ‘most
at-risk’ groups are presented in mainstream discourses as posing a threat to the
‘imagined immunity’ and ‘imagined solidarity’ of the dominant majority of
Chinese population (2016: 191).
In Desiring China, Lisa Rofel makes specific reference to suzhi discourse’s
relationship with the Chinese government, positioning it as the means through which the
Chinese government dictates “proper” and “improper” desire. In describing the
government of postsocialist China, she proposes a conceptual “triangulation” of
“repression” (inhibition of human nature), “interests” (self-regulation), and “passion”
(excess). She states, “Between repression and passion lies socialism, while between
passion and interest lies capitalism. The dilemma for China is to find the proper balance
between interests and passions” (2007: location 2486). Essentially, Rofel is referring to
how passions and interests are totally unrestrained in Western neoliberal capitalist
expansion, but that, although China is experiencing similar capitalist expansion, suzhi
discourse is being employed in determining whether homosexuality as a desire or passion
is proper or improper. Most importantly, it seeks to determine in what ways (if any)
homosexual desire can be rendered “proper” in Chinese society.
The Chinese Family Unit
As Altman suggests, dealing with family struggles is a (virtually) universal aspect
of being an individual with same-sex desires. Yet, the mere existence of family struggles
does not validate Altman’s framing of family struggles as a “graduation,” as if they exist
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on a spectrum ranging from “oppressive” to “not oppressive” on which all cultures follow
a linear path.
Unlike its typical Western conception, with its distinct separation between
individual and family, I refer to the Chinese family as a “unit” because in Chinese culture
it is “the most basic and profound institution” in which “everyone is, first, a daughter or
son of her/his parents” (Chou 2001: 33-4; 曾仕强 2004). This de-centering of the
individual in relation to the family, a concept relatively alien in Western culture although
not totally nonexistent, and his position, duties, and desires in relation to that decentering
equates not to a more restrictive version of the Western-style family; rather, it is a totally
separate definition.
The role of the individual within the family unit is best understood through the
duties the individual (i.e. the “daughter/son of his/her parents”) owes to their parents,
specifically the duties of marriage and (male) offspring-production (Kong 2016: 497).
The duty of child-bearing is conceptualized in “传宗接代” (Chuan zong jie dai), the
Confucian principle which bestows the duty of continuing the bloodline onto each
family’s male heirs. In modern times, this duty persists, evident in the maintained
adherence to Mengzi’s “不孝有三，无后为大” (《河北師范大学学报》1993). The
actual meaning of this phrase is contested, but in modern, mainstream Chinese society it
is understood to mean “There are three duties a child must fulfill for his family, otherwise
he is unfilial” – Chuan zong jie dai is one of these three duties.
Mr. Xu vs. Fang Gang
The court system is a key tool for the government’s moralizing efforts. A key
aspect of the Chinese court system is its lack of “precedence” – which is more relevant to
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the “bottom-up” (i.e. beginning with the individual and then recognized by the
government) nature of social change in Western society. Instead, Chinese courts function
on a case-by-case basis, indicating the increased prevalence of “top-down” social change
(Rofel 2007: location 2439). The active and flexible role the Chinese government plays in
this “moral socialization” is evident in this fundamental difference. One major instance of
this specificity with regards to homosexuality is the case of Mr. Xu vs Fang Gang.
Lisa Rofel describes this case in Desiring China. In 1999, a case was brought by
“Mr. Xu” against a man named Fang Gang, who claimed that Mr. Xu was gay in his book
Homosexuality in China. Mr. Xu brought the case against Fang Gang for libel, not
because he was called a homosexual, but because he lost his job, fiancée, and friends as a
result of being called a homosexual. The judge ruled in favor of Mr. Xu, and included in
his ruling that “homosexuality is seen as an abnormal behavior.” Psychologists weighed
in on the case, such as Zong Zhong, who made the (accurate) claim that “foreigners
medicalized homosexuality, not Chinese.” Fang Gang appealed the case, requesting that
that part of the ruling be deleted, and the court, despite still finding him guilty of libel,
found him in favor and retracted the statement that homosexuality is abnormal (2007:
location 2413-2452).
Gay Linguistics
Linguistics plays a relevant role both in developing and articulating identity – The
terms attached to an identity gives insight into the goals, values, and beliefs of the
community organized around that identity.
In Speaking in Queer Tongues: Globalization and Gay Language, Leap and
Boellstorff write analyze the specific cultural and historical phenomena that shape “gay
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men’s English”: “The politics and symbolics of the Stonewall riots, the imperatives of the
coming-out experience, and ideas of gay community and gay ghetto as well as rainbow
flags, pink triangles, and other material markers of gay presence and gay pride” (2004:
2). For the American gay liberation movement, given its roots in the 1969 Stonewall
Riots, started by (primarily) trans women of color throwing bricks at police in response to
(another) police infiltration of New York’s Stonewall Inn, along with its confrontational
identity politics tactics, the reclamation of “queer” and its incorporation into the nonhetorosexual vocabulary is hardly surprising, and although the more recent reclamation of
“faggot” can be jarring at first, that word’s incorporation into the vocabularies of trans
and “femme” (i.e. feminine-presenting or non-binary) people is also not surprising,
especially given the routine murdering of trans people (especially trans women of color)
that continues today with little to no media coverage (Schmider 2017).
Leap and Boellstorff turn to address the uneven international stage of linguistics
and the importance of developing a localized (culturally-relevant) gay vocabulary:
Frequently, discussions of globalization assume a Western source, and a one-way
movement of material and intellectual commodities from that source toward a
recipient framed as "more distant," often through the term third world. As the
essays in this collection indicate, speech communities located "over there" and
"away from" assumed centers of political, economic, and cultural domination are
not the only groups of speakers affected by the global circulation of same-sexrelated linguistic practices...Gay linguistic practices that seem to originate in the
West can compound the dilemma of authenticity, a problem that several
contributors to this volume explore in terms of sexual citizenship,
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transculturation, and belonging. What is needed is a processual approach that
avoids defining ahead of time what will count as authentic in favor of
investigating the cultural logics through which authenticity is shaped in particular
setting (2004: 2, 7).
As such, in my analysis I will not only be considering the development of a
Chinese gay vernacular but also the ways in which Chinese navigate the frameworks of –
but do not “uncritically adopt” – an unequal, colonial globalized gay vernacular in efforts
of cosmopolitan legitimacy, personal validation, etc. To speak on the latter, I quote
Martin Manalansan, a prominent researcher of Filipino sexuality: “What do we mean
when we say ‘gay’ in a world where hybridity and syncretism provide the grist for
cultural production, distribution and consumption?” (2004:1).
“同志” (Tongzhi), often used in the Chinese gay community to describe a
person (male or female) with same-sex desires, is a concept that is referenced across
virtually all research produced on Chinese gay identity. Tongzhi is “a Chinese translation
from a Soviet communist term ‘comrade,’ which refers to the revolutionaries that shared
a comradeship” and was first used by the gay community in 1997 (Chou 28). Chou
references the specific meanings attached to and intentions behind tongzhi identification:
Tongzhi adopted the most sacred term in Communist China as their identity,
signifying both a desire to indigenize sexual politics and to reclaim their cultural
identity. The reappropriation struck the community for its positive cultural
references, gender neutrality, de-sexualizing of the stigma of homosexuality, its
politics beyond the homo-hetero binarism, and its indigenous cultural identity for
integrating the sexual into the social...Tongzhi achieves a similar political
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contribution as ‘queer politics’ does, but whereas queer politics confronts the
mainstream by appropriating a formerly derogatory label, tongzhi harmonizes
social relationships by taking the most sacred title from the mainstream culture
(27-8).
Interestingly, just as “queer” emphasizes and memorializes the aggressively
homophobic history and structure of Western society, tongzhi, as if in reflection of a
history and society lacking such homophobia – or in reflection of a different social justice
process – serves to redirect the focus away from confrontational identitarian politics and
towards harmonization in Chinese society.
Cosmopolitanism
Finally, cosmopolitanism is a concept (directly or indirectly) considered in
virtually all research on modern identity. This is because the core ideal of
cosmopolitanism – that “all human beings, regardless of their political affiliation, are (or
can and should be) citizens in a single community” (Kleingeld and Brown 2002) – is
closely related to the effects of globalization. Evaluation of the reality of
cosmopolitanism and its effects determine how researchers envision the influence of
globalization.
For instance, after making specific reference to Altman’s global gay identity,
Kong says “These newly emerged identities uncritically embrace the reign of
cosmopolitanism and nascent capitalism” (2016: 505). This “uncritical” embrace of “the
reign of cosmopolitanism,” closely linked to George Ritzer’s “grobalization” theory, is
referred to in his book The Globalization of Nothing. Ritzer states the globalization of
“nothing” – grobalization theory – entails five points: Lacking in distinctive substance,
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generic, no local ties, time-less, and dehumanized (2004: 53). On the other hand,
however, over-emphasis of cultural specificities – glocalization theory – with its focus
only on unique localities, is similarly “uncritical,” despite producing “something” rather
than “nothing” this time – “Something” that has totally distinctive substance, is totally
unique, only has local ties, is entirely temporally specific, and is completely founded in
human relations (53). This viewpoint entirely disregards the role and value of
cosmopolitanism.
Methods
I review case studies of China for my methodology. I chose China as a case for
two major reasons: First, I can read and speak Chinese (to a degree); second, China is an
emergent economic, political, and cultural power that will increasingly influence
transnational meanings and directions of “gay” identity and queer theory in the coming
years. I examine a range of studies and documents including ancient stories, historical
research, an online same-sex community, laws, entertainment media, news media,
sociological studies, and emergent (Chinese) queer theory in understanding order to
provide a background on the history of and current reality of homosexuality and “gay”
identity in China.
As a note, any information found in my research that includes the original
statement in Chinese indicates that I have translated it myself. Citations that use Chinese
characters for the author indicate that I read the source in Chinese and am relying on my
own translations of that source. Additionally, I should make it clear at this point that my
research is almost entirely exclusive to males. Although I would prefer to include
research on lesbianism (as well as analysis of a range of “alternate” genders and
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sexualities), including the element of gender would require a degree of understanding
about its intersectionality and influencing factors, a degree of understanding which I do
not (yet) have.
History of Homosexuality in China
Dating back to ancient China, there are a few stories that document same-sex
sexual encounters between two males. These stories include 《断袖之癖》(The Passion
of the Cut Sleeve) (班固: 111 BCE), 《分桃之爱》(The Love of the Half-Eaten Peach)
(说难: mid-3rd century BCE), and 《龙阳之癖》(The Passion of Longyang) (战国策: 5th
– 3rd century BCE). A clear social hierarchy is evident in each of these stories: A socially
dominant figure (i.e. an emperor, a military leader) has a sexual encounter with a social
inferior (i.e. “男宠,” literally “male pet”) that does not entail any long-term
relationship. Throughout ancient Chinese history, Chinese society maintained a “tolerant”
view (of varying degrees) towards same-sex encounters, but these encounters did not
imply (homo)sexual identity because sexuality was not a “separable category of behavior
and existence” and thus not conceptualized as an identity (Chou 2001).
During the Republican Era (1912-1949), sexual identity “emerged” in Chinese
society. Contact with the West resulted in the importation of a medicalized (pseudoscientific) form of homosexuality during a time in which Chinese people placed great
value on Western scientific and medical theory during this period: “Chinese scholars,
‘enlightened’ by Western scientific discourses, began to see homosexuality as a
temporary aberration and mental disease” (Chou 2001; Kong 2016).
During China’s shift to Maoism (1949-76), the 1950 Marriage Law invalidated
traditional marriage practices and proliferated the institution of monogamous
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heterosexual marriage (Kong 2016). Furthermore, there was a repression not just of
homosexuality, but of sexuality, sexual desire, and “passion” in general. Homosexuality
was forbidden under the law of “流氓罪” (“Hooliganism”) along with extra/premarital sex and even non-sexual moral “deviance” such as vandalism (Liu 2015;
Rofel 2007; Zhang 2005).
Following Maoism and entering postsocialism (1980-present), the status of
sexuality and sexual desire underwent a massive transformation. Maoist repression of
sexual desire – the most relevant out of a plethora of repressed desires – was heavily
criticized. In response, there was a “sexual revolution” during which sex in general, from
premarital and extramarital sex to homosexuality, proliferated (Zhang 2005; Kong 2016;
Rofel 2007; 潘绥铭 2006). As China neared the 21st century, AIDS went through both its
“introductory phase” (1985-1988), “spreading phrase” (1989-1994), and was beginning
its “expansion phase” (1995-present) (Lo 2015). Meanwhile, sociological studies such as
《他们的世界——中国男同性恋群落透视》 (Their World: A Study of Male
Homosexuality in China) (李银河 1993) maintained a biomedical approach to
(medicalized) homosexuality, attempting to “diagnosing” its causes (Kong 2016).

Lynam 27

Time period

Year

Homosexuality & gay identity
status

Ancient and Imperial China

Republican Era

Maoism

Pre-21st Century Postsocialist
China

Post-21st Century
Contemporary China

~1500 BCE –1911 CE

Relatively large variation,
typically “tolerant” (Chou
2001); no “sexual identity”

1912 – 1949

Importation of Western
(medicalized homo)sexual
identity; homosexuality
increasingly labelled as
mental illness

1949 – 1976

1980 – 2000

2000 – Present

Homosexuality morally
pathologized as “Western
decadence” and labelled
under “hooliganism”;
repression of sexual desire in
general; exaltation of
monogamous (heterosexual)
marriage
Renewed attention to and
encouragement of sexual
desire and passion; AIDS
reaches China; homosexuality
maintains medicalized and
pathologized status
Continued “sexual
revolution”; homosexuality
declassified as mental illness
(2002) but retains moral
pathologization; new shifts in
research on homosexuality
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Present Study
In compiling qualitative primary source data, I have extensively examined the
website 知乎 (Zhihu, “Did You Know?”) Zhihu is a Chinese “question-and-answer”
website in which individuals pose questions and other people can respond. Previously,
only qualified scientists or researchers could respond, but now anyone has the ability to
provide input. The website is conceptually categorized – there is a 同性恋 (tongxinglian,
“homosexuality”) “subdivision” or “community” that is frequented by thousands of
Chinese-speaking netizens and contains questions that have been viewed an upwards of
over two million times. In my research, I have analyzed answers to the following
questions – only some of which are directly referred to in my later analysis – that are
contained within three overarching themes relevant to (homo)sexual identity:
1. 出柜 (chugui, a direct translation of “Coming out of the closet”):
a. “出柜是种怎样的体验？” (“What is coming out like?”) – Viewed
331,497 times.
b. “出柜到底有多难？” (“How hard really is it to come out?”) – Viewed
387,869 times.
c. “你是如何出柜的？” (“How did you come out?”) – Viewed 2,876,806
times.
d. “怎么告诉爸妈自己是同性恋的现实？” (“How do you tell your
parents the truth about you being gay?”) – Viewed 115,011 times.
2. 形婚 (xinghun, “Fake marriage”):
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a. “成功‘形婚’是怎样的一种体验？” (“What is a successful fake
marriage like?”) – Viewed 410,786 times.
b. “你是如何看待形婚的？” (“How do you view fake marriages?”) –
Viewed 8,487 times.
c. “在国内环境下形婚是否可行，可能面临怎样的困境？” (“Are fake
marriages acceptable in China? What challenges might one face?”) –
Viewed 63,419 times.
3. 骄傲活动/同性恋游行 (“Pride parades”):
a. “Apple 大力支持的骄傲游行 (Pride Parade) 是个怎样的活动？”
(“What was Apple’s pride parade like?”) – Viewed 32,701 times.
b. “同性恋游行（LGBT PRIDE）是否会在实质上造成更大的负面效
果？” (Don’t pride parades have more of a negative effect than positive
in reality?”) – Viewed 30,560 times.
c. “为什么同性恋游行，都把自己打扮得很特别？” (“Why does
everyone at pride parades dress so strangely?”); “为什么同性恋要举行
同性恋游行？...为什么要我们大家都去支持你们的行为？” (“Why
do homosexuals hold pride parades?...Why do you want all of us to
support your actions?”); “为什么同性恋游行那么夸张？” (“Why are
pride parades so exaggerated?”) – Viewed 876; 60; and 447 times
respectively.
Zhihu is an incredibly useful data source for a couple of reasons. First and most
obviously, the entire website is in Chinese and so (virtually) the only participants are
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people who can speak Chinese. Second, it is a public platform for discourse on
homosexuality in Chinese society (and internationally) that has the potential to
encompass views from a range of classes, locations, ages backgrounds, etc. Third, users
can anonymously participate (and do so a majority of the time), and this detachment from
personal identity allows users to freely participate and provide more “honest” answers –
or, at least, answers that are more reflective of their personal desires, hopes, and goals.
Loretta Ho’s assessment of same-sex online communities in Gay and Lesbian
Subculture in Urban China (2009) pulls from a range of studies and her own experiences
in same-sex “cyberspace” communities (e.g. Gaybyte) to present conclusions that
correspond strikingly well with my Zhihu data. On one hand, we both agree that these
communities are (in my opinion, incredibly useful; in her opinion, relatively unimportant)
self-help groups which can “provide imaginative resources for urgent and intense local
struggles”; on the other, however, Ho writes a justified warning that these communities
can also “(re)produce certain universal myths, stereotypes, and misrepresentations about
the ‘Western’ gay scene as a gay haven” (2009: 101-105).
In addition to this danger, Zhihu as a data resource does have a couple distinct
limitations. Zhihu inherently fails to fully and comprehensively capture voices across all
classes, ages, and locations for two reasons: First, its prerequisites for Internet access and
participation in mainstream online culture; second, as is often the case for “self-help”
groups, a user’s entry onto the website is typically – but not always – predicated by
feelings of alienation or dissociation from family, friends, society, etc. Furthermore, there
is a rating system attached to the comments; individual users can “upvote” a comment
they agree with or like or “downvote” a comment they disagree with or dislike. The result
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is that comments are ordered on the basis of their upvotes, with the comment with the
most upvotes being the first one that is seen. Essentially, this voting system regulates the
visibility of certain opinions and voices. Opinions that represent divergence from the
group mentality shared by the dominant demographics of the website are pushed to the
bottom, while those that support dominant ideologies easily rise to the top, creating an
ideological echo chamber despite the actual existence of a range of (often competing)
ideologies.
In addition to Zhihu, I also consider homosexuality in mainstream media. I
analyze an episode of the popular contemporary debate show 《奇萌说》 (“U Can U
BiBi”) that deals with the question “该不该向父母出柜？” (“Should you come out to
your parents?”) (2015). Evidence of the strong grip the Chinese government has on the
media is in its implementation of 《电视剧内容制作通则》 (“General rules for TV
drama content production”), which makes direct reference to homosexuality in its
statement that “表现和展示非正常的性关系、性行为”等内容不得出现在电视剧
中，如同性恋等。” (“Expression and display of abnormal sexual relations, sex itself,
etc. cannot be displayed in TV dramas, e.g. homosexuality”) (观察者 2016; 中国电视剧
制作产业协会 2015).
Furthermore, “新媒体时代下同性恋群体形象去污化初探” (“A Preliminary
Investigation into Homosexuality’s Increasingly Ameliorated Image during the Age of
New Media”), provides a look into how homosexuality, which had a negative reputation
during the reign of “traditional” media, is being rebranded in a more positive light by
modern media sources (张格 2016). Also, one week ago as of writing, gay news source
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淡蓝 (Danlan) released the headline “华中科技大学操场出现‘反同性恋横幅’”
(“‘Homophobic banner’ raised on sports field of Huazhong University of Science and
Technology”) (2017), which was immediately followed the next day by the headline of
“同志妈妈现身华科大：别让恐同者伤害孩子” (“Mothers of gay students appear in
person at Huazhong U: ‘Don’t let homophobes hurt our children’”) (2017).
In addition, I pair a new survey and law for further research. Researchers who
conducted “The One Child Policy and Its Impact on Chinese Families” claim that in the
six years between 1988 and 1994 there was approximately a twenty percent drop – from
44.8 percent to 24.5 percent – in the percentage of people over sixty years old who
supported “living together with at least one married child” (Settles and Sheng 2008).
They neglected to recognize, however, that the 1988 survey was conducted nationwide,
whereas the 1994 survey was only conducted in Beijing. That important piece of
information helps give insight into why last year 上海民政 (Shanghai Civil Affairs
Bureau) announced that it would begin enforcing 《上海市老年人权益保障条例》
(“Protective Regulations for the Rights and Interests of the Elderly”). The fifth stipulation
of these protective regulations states: “督促落实家庭赡养义务，维护老年人的合法
权益。《条例》对赡养人在经济供养、生活照料和精神慰藉等方面的义务都有明确
的规定。 ” (It “urge[s] the fulfilling of [elderly] care responsibilities as well as
protecting their legal rights and interests”, further stating that “‘regulations’ with regards
to economic support, daily care, ‘spiritual comfort,’ and other responsibilities are all
clearly defined") (上海民政 2016). In an interesting example of “legislating” filial piety,
this law states that children must fulfill obligations such as “常回家看看” (“Return
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home to see your parents regularly”), otherwise they can be sued by their parents for
negligence (参考消息 2016; 上海民政 2016).
Finally, I present two recent sociological studies of homosexuality in China: “家
庭视角下中国同性恋者缔结异性婚姻的伦理探求” (“Ethical Exploration of
Heterosexual Marriage by Chinese Homosexuals from the Perspective of Family”) (赵御
辰 2014) and “隐匿与显现：J 市男同性恋者社会互动研究” (“Hidden and Visible:
A Gay Social Interaction Study in J[ilin] City”) (吴维 2015). These studies analyze
methods of interpersonal communication between gays in China (such as through the
Chinese gay “dating” app “Blued” or public cruising) and approaches to mediating
personal desire and marriage pressures from family. Neither study concerns itself with
cross-cultural comparison between “Chinese gays” and “Western gays”; rather, they are
focused on capturing the heterogeneity of gay life situated within China. Furthermore,
although they discuss different “micro topics” (i.e. communication and ethics), they share
a correlation with one specific “macro concept” – coming out.
Analysis
Marriage pressures and recent shifts
Naturally, “importation of Western sexuality” – at the risk of oversimplifying a
relatively complex process – included the Western marriage system. Previous marriage
systems permitted (within reason) a man with primarily same-sex desires to
simultaneously participate in heterosexual marriage and use extramarital sex to fulfill
(homo)sexual desire (Kong 2016; Chou 2001). Maoist repression of excessive sex,
however, resulted in the intolerance of extramarital sex, which continued during the
postsocialist period (Liu 2015; Rofel 2007).
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Postsocialist pursuit of desire, influenced through both exposure to Western
ideologies and through efforts to “correct” Maoist (sexual) repression of passion and
human nature, shifted the primary function of marriage away from reproduction and delegitimized arranged marriages (Rofel 2007). Emphasis on “romantic love” replaced its
primary function of reproduction. Romantic love, combined with condemnation of
extramarital sex, resulted in a consolidation of marriage and (hetero)sexual desire. For
heterosexuals, being able to choose one’s partner meant that this consolidation had little
impact on their quality of life. For homosexuals, however, this resulted in a dramatic drop
in quality of life, as, unlike heterosexuals, marriage became strictly exclusive to, rather
than inclusive of, sexual desire.
This phenomenon has had devastating implications for gays within the context of
the Chinese family unit. Those who truly do not feel sexual attraction towards the
opposite sex inevitably end up in a lose-lose situation. Either they can choose not to
marry, “failing their role” as the “son/daughter of his/her parents,” or they can marry a
woman, implicating an unknowing victim and denying her an aspect of marriage and life
– sexual fulfillment – that, in a modern context, should be guaranteed (Chou 2001).
Traditional Chinese culture dictates that he should choose the latter because his success
in the family unit depends on both marriage and (male) offspring production, but the
recent proliferation of “desire” of all types (which is quite a personal and subjective
feeling (Rofel 2012)) through neoliberal capitalist experiments has inspired a range of
approaches in dealing with, coping with, mediating, responding to, even confronting, the
“inevitability” of their heterosexual marriages.
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Furthermore, feelings on homosexuality are quickly shifting in China. The debate
show 《奇葩说》(“U Can U BiBi”) is rife with “out” gay debaters, especially on the
“你该不该向父母出柜？” (“Should you come out to your parents?”) episode. Zhihu
users on a thread titled “ 《奇葩说》中有几个 gay？” (“How many gays are on ‘U
Can U BiBi’”?) have posited the show contains a cast of somewhere between five to nine
gays or lesbians, out of a crew of about fifteen (2015).
Despite the Chinese government’s “oppression” of homosexuals (the nature and
severity of which I will analyze in the coming chapters) and its “authoritarian” control of
the media, a growing number of examples of an improving social climate towards
homosexuality are available even on Chinese media sources, a trend that is analyzed in
“新媒体时代下同性恋群体形象去污化初探” (“A Preliminary Investigation into
Homosexuality’s Increasingly Ameliorated Image during the Age of New Media”) (张格
2016). An extremely recent example in the media of such, in this case of supportive
family members, is the mothers of gay students at Huazhong University of Science and
Technology who took direct action for the protection of their children (淡蓝 2017). In
response to photos of two members of Huazhong University’s women’s basketball team
holding a banner that read “维护中华民族传统伦理，捍卫社会主义核心价值；抑制
西方腐朽思想侵蚀，让同性恋远离大学校园”(传送门 2017) (Protect Chinese
traditional morality, defend socialism’s core values; curb the erosion of morals that has
been brought on by the decadence of Western thought, make gays go far away from this
university”), the mothers of gay university students at Huazhong University gathered in
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person on the campus, holding a banner1 that read “别让恐同者伤害我们的孩子！”
(“Don’t let homophobes hurt our children!”) (淡蓝 2017).
As I will point out in later chapters, such stories of unconditional love and
acceptance are not always the case. Not coming out to family members at all still remains
a common choice. Regardless, the importance of these stories and events are found in
their reflection of an increasing acceptance of homosexuality that has not required the use
of any kind of “confrontational” or overtly political “liberation” tactics.
Desires for Integration
In navigating this troubling situation, one concept stands at the heart: Coming out.
One example comes from a meeting in the 1990s at one of Beijing’s gay cafes recorded
by Lisa Rofel. Ah Zhuang, a man in his forties who was an “elder” in the group and was
known for running a gay hotline in China and being a mentor for many young Chinese
gays, said the following in a debate about family: “In my experience, dealing with so
many Chinese gays, it is wrong to tell your parents. This is not part of Chinese culture.
We Chinese must look after our parents and not bring them so much grief...It is selfish to
only think of yourself. Perhaps that kind of thing works elsewhere, but not here in China”
(2007: location 1762).
Comments on Zhihu do not correspond with such an “unconditional rejection” of
coming out that Ah Zhuang suggests, but do strongly maintain the need for considering
the wishes of one’s parents before coming out. The popular strategies produced on Zhihu
typically involve non-confrontational “family mediation” methods. One such comment in

1

(A banner that was also in the color red, just as the homophobic one before it was -- a small detail but an
interesting choice given that red is the classic symbol of Maoist socialism, an ideology clearly being used
as a homophobic tactic such in the first banner)
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response to“怎么告诉爸妈自己是同性恋的现实？” (“How do you tell your parents
about the reality of you being gay?”; over one hundred thousand views); this comment,
which is by and far the most popular comment on the thread with a “vote ratio” of
positive six hundred eighty-two – over six times that of the next highest comment –
reads:
You definitely need to be extremely, extremely careful with how you approach
coming out. Although it’s true that you’re doing nothing wrong, you just want to
be honest with your parents about it, but you have to remember how many years
they spent raising you, so you should be extra careful in making sure you
minimize the damage done to them. What I’m trying to say here is that the biggest
difficulty actually isn’t related to any kind of psychological barrier [i.e. Westernstyle homophobia], parents’ love is extremely powerful, the issue isn’t really them
accepting you. But, even if they accept that their son is gay, you can’t protect
them from the negative comments they will receive from people around them, and
those comments will hurt them. The latter is the worst of it (Anonymous User
2012).2
Unlike in the interaction between Western family (whose goals and desires are
typically seen as being secondary to that of the individual) and gay identity in Western
society, which frames the family’s resistance to gay identity as “homophobic” and “their
own fault”, socially positioning the individual who came out as “overcoming adversity”

2

出柜这件事情，请一定带着一万分的小心去做。虽然你确实没做错什么，只是诚实地告诉父母一
个事实，但是看在他们养育你那么多年的分上，多花点心思让他们少受伤害，绝对没错。在这里我
想说的是，最大的困难其实不在于他们的心理障碍，父母的爱是很博大的，他们接受你没有想象中
那么困难。但是，即使他们接受有一个同性恋儿子，周围人的非议却是不能阻挡的，而且会对他们
造成伤害。后者更为可怕。
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and “staying true to one’s self,” this example reveals a different approach to dealing with
family. Although Western and Chinese families both regularly pose major challenges to
expression of gay identity, the Chinese family, unlike the Western family, is not viewed
by the gay individual as the “source” of homophobia or oppression, but rather it is the
social “Other” or the “周围人” (which the above user makes reference to; i.e. the people
who their parents regularly interact with) that is the source.
Cosmopolitan Horizons
If integration or mediation strategies are not possible or are ineffective, neoliberal
capitalist expansion has provided a few contemporary routes for Chinese gays:
Mobilization and/or becoming “high suzhi”. Recent advancements in mobilization have
paved new paths for modern Chinese gays who refuse both confrontational modes of
coming out as well as the family’s (heterosexual) marriage duties. Comments found on
Zhihu reveal the impact of new mobilization opportunities. Answers often suggest
moving to a different city: “虽然说起来有点残忍，但是劝你最好最好不跟父母在一
个城市” (“Although it’s rather cruel, I still suggest your best, best option is to not live
with your parents in the same city”); (Anonymous User, +682 vote ratio, (“How do you
tell your parents about the reality of you being gay?” 2012). Assumptions of
independence (economic or otherwise) characterizes this new mobility: “首先，你的父
母也只是人罢了。他们可以有自己根深蒂固的观点而不接纳你，那是他们的选择。
而你的人生，本可以无需他们的成全。” (“First of all, your parents are just people.
They can go ahead and have their conservative, stubborn point of view and not accept
you. That’s their choice. But your life, it doesn’t depend on your parents’ help”) (User 支
元叹, +185 vote ratio, “How difficult is it to come out?”, ~388,000 views 2016).
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Suzhi dynamics are intimately related to the expanding horizons of mobility.
Cultivating suzhi as holding promises for future family integration is a theme quite
evident on Zhihu: “成为一个让人称颂的人。用给他们一方面的心理满足去弥补另
一方面的缺憾。” (“Become someone that people praise. Give [your parents] one
aspect of psychological fulfillment so that they can overlook your shortcoming [i.e.
homosexuality]”) (Anonymous User, +682 2012). General trends of who can and cannot,
does and does not, “reveal” their homosexuality are reflective of suzhi dynamics.
Consider three major non-heterosexual icons in Chinese society: Kevin Tsai, 金星 (Jin
Xing), and 李银河 (Li Yinhe). These people are all involved in drastically different
pursuits – Kevin Tsai is a popular TV show host in Taiwan, 金星 is an internationallyacclaimed dancer, and 李银河 is the “mother” of sexology and queer theory development
in China. Furthermore, they even all have different labels for their sexuality: Tsai is
“gay,” 金星 is “trans,” and 李银河 is “bi”. Yet, in all three of these instances, their nonheterosexual identities were not “publicized,” i.e. made visible and conscious to greater
society, until after they had already amassed their massive followings for their success in
other fields totally unrelated to their personal sexuality.
For the modern, cosmopolitan Chinese gay, the future still seems brimming with
opportunities despite their (homo)sexuality. From family acceptance of homosexuality
(the dream) to studying or working out-of-state or out-of-country (the alternative) to
being able to outright reject family duties (the luxury), this range of possibilities and
options colors the lives of cosmopolitan gays in China. Yet, despite all of the glamor and
allure found in cosmopolitanism, lives exist beyond its borders – lives that are often
invisible, especially to the Western gaze.
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Lacking Options; Lacking Voices; Lacking Suzhi
Up until this point, very little consideration has been given to (inherently) low
suzhi individuals who have no independence and cannot “risk” failed family integration
or mediation attempts. It is in this arena – an arena that is drastically underrepresented in
virtual cosmopolitan communities and is the target of disdain in physical cosmopolitan
areas (surely, there is a correlation) – that 形婚 (fake marriage) becomes a relevant area
for consideration.
The voices of these people are silenced not only by the (morally- and even statejustified) classism inherent suzhi discourse, but also by the intersection of pervading
Western homonationalism (i.e. that the West and especially America is inherently more
“gay friendly” than non-Western countries because of relatively arbitrary signifiers such
as pride parades and gay marriage legalization) and lasting colonialism in China, both of
which produce a psychic anxiety within Chinese gay communities (especially obvious
online) about producing the “proper” Chinese gay images and representations (Rofel
2007; Anagnost 2004; Kipnis 2007; Ho 2011). Yet, there are extremely niche areas in
which this voice can still be heard, even online: For Zhihu, that area is found in discourse
on fake marriages.
If one were to analyze the top comments provided on questions such as “在国内
环境下形婚是否可行，可能面临怎样的困境？” (“Are fake marriages acceptable in
China? What challenges might one face?”) (With around sixty thousand views, this post
nearly has more views than the combined view-counts of every single post on pride
parades), they would find not only a denouncement of fake marriages (The first sentence
of the first comment: “大部分情况下，不可行。” (“In most cases, it’s definitely not
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acceptable.”)) (User 温和又清真2015), but also an obvious lack of lived or shared
experiences.
Scrolling down the page, into the “downvoted zone”, into the area of the
“incorrect” and “improper,” however, means venturing into stories of such lived
experiences. One user (who received a “vote ratio” of a whopping positive four votes, in
comparison to over one to two hundred amassed by top comments), says the following
(the original script reproduced in the footnotes):
My answer might not help you because my reason for fake marriage is very
simple, so our situations might be different. I was married for fourteen years. If
you want to find a spouse for a fake marriage, you have to make clear guidelines
for the marriage…Mine were as such: First, the marriage is short-term; second,
we won’t live together; third, I don’t want kids...For me, the hardest part has been
having to lie...Facing co-workers, friends, family members...I’m always lying. It
makes me tired. My heart is tired3 (User 从丶 2016).
Another comment, this one containing a glaring criticism of top comments,
similarly received a positive three “vote ratio.” He writes:
Look at all these people saying fake marriages means gays are going and hurting
people. Please go think for a second, go understand what fake marriages are and
then come back, alright? Look at you guys, ‘Do fake marriages have positive

3

我的回答可能帮助不到你，因为我型婚的目的很简单，咱们情况可能不同。我是 14 年结婚的，
如果你寻找型婚对象，你们必须所有的目的要求一致，很重要。我就是想要一个婚姻，不接受孩
子，所以条件就是 1.短期型婚 2.不同住 3.不要孩子，就以上三个硬性要求对方也是这样的，所以
我们合适。见面，谈细节，统一各种口径。对我来说，最难的事情，就是谎言，因为事先有约定，
双方不干涉对方生活，只应付各种节日见父母，朋友。所以面对同事，朋友，家人的询问，是我最
不想面对的，总是在不停的编着谎言，累，心累。
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effects?’ ‘What problems are faced?’ Also, the preliminary consideration isn’t just
simply what country you’re in; but rather, you have to make decisions based on
the reality of yourself, your partner, your parents, etc. You’re assuming that
American gays don’t have any problems just because America legalized gay
marriage, but I believe they still face huge problems. If you want an opinion that
is against the general consensus here, I personally think fake marriages are
acceptable...4 (Anonymous User 2016).
Both of these comments reflect an unfortunate reality for many gay men in China,
a reality whose images and meanings can rarely transgress their localized boundaries.
This is the situation for gay men who are caught in-between competing and conflicting
notions of the very meanings of life and homosexuality’s place within those meanings.
Yet, unlike those mentioned in previous chapters, these men lack access to mobilization
and the tools for suzhi cultivation, and their alternate routes reflect those differences.
Investigating government control and perceived “homophobia”
As neoliberal expansion and experiments continuously “reconfigure” the desires
of China’s (gay) citizens, the government continues to employ suzhi discourse in a range
of arenas in order to (in)directly guide those capitalist and cosmopolitan desires (Rofel
2007; Anagnost 2004). Most evident in 上海民政’s (Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau’s)
recent “常回家看看” regulations (essentially anti-negligence laws) (2016), these

4

看到有人说形婚是同性恋出来害人。拜托过过脑子，弄明白什么是形婚再出来逼逼好吗？形婚是
不是有效，会面临什么问题。前提不是在哪个国家，而是要根据你自身的，伴侣的，形婚对象的，
双方家长甚至四方家长的实际情况来判断，就算是在美国同性恋婚姻合法的大环境下面，我相信还
是有很多的同性伴侣会面临各式各样的问题。如果非要来个笼统大概的意见，我个人觉得可以形
婚...
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emergent cosmopolitan and neoliberal desires (along with accompanying economic
development) appear to be challenging the feasibility of certain cornerstones of Chinese
culture and morality, leading the urban citizen “morally astray” – a phenomenon that is
distinctly manifested in the massive regional discrepancies evident in social climate
surveys on three-generation households (Settles and Sheng 2008).
Threatened by the erosion of the previously cohesive and physically-rooted family
structure in the face of cosmopolitan expansion in postsocialist China, the government
seems to be taking an increasingly proactive role in constructing a “socialist spiritual
civilization” (Bai 2014: 39) that is specifically targeted at maintaining the family
structure and other traditional cultural elements. Guiding the social sphere through “topdown” change, the Chinese government is exerting its far-reaching influence in the
realms of legislation (上海民政 2016; 中国电视剧制作产业协会 2015) and media (Bai
2014; 中国电视剧制作产业协会 2015; Fox 2016; 《奇葩说》2015) through moral
appeals to family and the elderly in a way that questions the “suzhi status” of its
objectors.
The messages that are transmitted (or are not transmitted) through the government
and suzhi discourse are especially relevant in understanding the direction of
homosexuality’s moral, social, and cultural status, and recently these messages have been
rather confusing and inconclusive. As it challenges on one hand pathologized foundations
of homophobia, such as the famous court case between Mr. Xu and Fang Gang, wherein
the court ruling originally referred to homosexuality as “abnormal” behavior but later
retracted its statement (Rofel 2007), and Chinese-language articles that suggest “new
media” portrays homosexuality in a much more positive light than previously (张格
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2016); on the other, the government has made decisions in the entertainment sphere that
directly challenge homosexuality’s supposedly “purified” image. It has created laws
specifically forbidding displays of homosexuality on TV – and it has enforced those laws
in a rather unforgiving manner (观察者 2016; 《奇葩说》2015).
Although these instances of “inadvertent” homophobia, which seem to be
primarily employed in the government’s preservation of overarching traditional themes,
are relatively understandable; unfortunately, just as the American military often
“inadvertently” kills innocent people by dropping bombs to kill “terrorists,” the Chinese
government’s relatively nonspecific and vague preservation of “morality” and “family
unit cohesion” is inadvertently harming the gay community.
It might seem odd that I choose the word “inadvertent” in describing the Chinese
government’s recent “attacks” on homosexuality – after all, the government’s official
proclamation of its new TV drama law specifically targets tongxinglian as an example of
“abnormal sexual relations” (观察者 2016); also, homosexuality was clearly an
underlying cause for 《奇葩说》’s (“U Can U BiBi”’s) debate on coming out (which
contained no displays of homosexuality beyond their debate topic and, well, the presence
of actors and actresses who are homosexuals) being taken off the air.
Yet, despite widespread, even cross-cultural, condemning narratives produced by
news media on these two phenomena (观察者 2016; Fox 2016) (such as in the
sickeningly homonationalist display produced by (Western and English-based) news
source The Independent, its headline reading “China bans depictions of gay people on TV
in crackdown on 'vulgar, immoral and unhealthy content',” accompanied by an image of
two gay Asian males kissing, holding rainbow flags, and wearing politicized “equal
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rights” shirts (Fox 2016) – the headline and photo obviously some subconscious
reification of a eurocentric imaginary that (mistakenly) claims to capture the “reality” of
“the Chinese psyche” – as if Chinese gays are totally entranced by an ephemeral Western
dreamscape overflowing with promises of utopian social equality, a utopia that stands
just an arm’s length away from their “reality” of Chinese authoritarianism and
homophobic oppression – if only they could reach it), I am hesitant to make similar
condemnations. With regards to the TV drama law, the law itself – not the short snippets
published by the media – is actually a laundry list of restrictions that spans eight pages.
The full list, which is available in Chinese on 中国电视剧制作产业协会’s (China
Television Drama Production Industry Association’s) website, involves requirements
such as “坚持以现实题材为主” (“Prioritize an adherence to themes or concepts that
are rooted in reality”), and it expressly forbids “损害人民军人、武装警察、国安、公
安、司法人员等特定职业、群体，以及社会组织，团体的公众形象” (“Depictions
of harming members of the military, armed police, national security, public security,
judicial personnel and similar special occupations, groups, as well as social organizations
and the collective public”) (2015: 2, 3).
The law is certainly bizarre and does indeed mention disapproving of
homosexuality, but I find it hard to believe that the Chinese government’s “true” motives
were rooted in direct homophobia. As for the “coming out” episode of 《奇葩说》(“U
Can U BiBi”), LeTV’s (and/or the government’s) censorship undeniably contains
homophobic connotations. Yet, I feel there were other elements present in that episode
that all contributed to its ultimate censorship. One element is the prevalence of contested
gender presentation norms, both in the presence of 金星 (Jin Xing), a trans woman, as
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well as a general theme of androgyny and gender nonbinarism among the cast: 邱晨 (Qiu
Chen) begins the show with a self-introduction; after she is done, the host immediately
tells her “邱晨，刚刚高晓松老师真诚地问一下我说‘她是男生女生？’” (“Qiu
Chen, just a second ago Mr. Gao Xiaosong [a host] honestly asked me “Is that a girl or a
boy?”) (“该不该向父母出柜？” 2015: 4:00). Five minutes into the show, the second
person to give an introduction was 轰叔 (Hong Shu), who is similarly androgynous, if not
more so than Qiu Chen.
Obviously, this gender nonbinarism was not uniformly embodied nor expressed
on the show, but a general environment of gender nonbinarism was clearly present. With
regards to “transgression” of (imaginary) gender “boundaries,” Rofel and Liu both agree
that there is a “dominant perception” of Maoist socialism in postsocialist China that relies
on a distorted, “revisionist history” in explaining Maoism’s shortcomings, tracing all of
its failures back to a single source: “Maoism’s suppression of ‘natural’ humanity” – a
production of women who were too masculine and of men who were “unable to find their
true masculinity”; both researchers conclude that this imagined historical narrative
encourages postsocialist China to “reject [its] socialist past” and, as a result, also
encourages distinct gender binarism (Liu 2015: 4; Rofel 2007: 272-294).
Furthermore, both overt and/or implicit encouragement for coming out to parents
(either through integrational or confrontational strategies) permeated communications to
the audience (communications orated by a staggeringly large amount of “already out”
actors and actresses), even by those actors/actresses supposedly given the role of
“opposing” that position. Westernized, confrontational modes of coming out were
prevalent – especially blatant in Hong Shu’s narrative: Reproduction of the Western
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closeted/out binary in which one is either openly gay or is a liar: “你不出柜，你就得骗
呗” (“If you don’t come out, then you have to lie”) (14:18); assumptions of universal
mobility and economic independence as well as self-centered (in comparison to familycentered) characterization of the parents as being oppressive by default and accepting by
choice: “可以挺直腰板跟你爸妈说：‘你的幸福不建立在繁殖恋，俗称异性恋的
基础上。’你有权利去选择你认为对的人生...那你是想，麻烦一时还是麻烦一
世？” (“You can stand with your back straight and say to your parents: ‘[My] happiness
doesn’t depend on my ability to produce offspring, that so-called foundation of
heterosexual love.’ You have the freedom to go choose whoever you think is right…[If
you’re worried about coming out,] then just think – do you want to carry a burden for a
little while or carry it for the rest of your life?”) (14:30-15:00).
Given the Chinese government’s dual management of both an eroding family
structure (which, at the micro-level, is potentially challenged or even destroyed by
coming out) and a desire to produce the “proper” type of citizens (“citizens” meaning not
only, for example, Hong Shu but also the people across China who look up to and are
influenced by him), I am not at all shocked – although still disappointed – that the
episode was censored. Whether this is direct homophobia or is a more general moralistic
trend enacted by the “post”-socialist government that, in this case, had unfortunate
homophobic implications, I think either position could be argued because of the case’s
lack of information, but it is dangerous to follow the eurocentric, homonationalist
assumptions inherent in using these two cases to portray the Chinese government as
unequivocally “hateful” of gay people in China. In fact, while the government is
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censoring the media in ways that implicate the status of homosexuality, it is also
producing knowledge on homosexuality that is directly improving its social status.
Indigenizing homosexuality
In between all of the confusing and contradicting narratives produced by the
government stands an undeniably optimistic shift in the focus of queer theory and
sociology. The government regularly plays a direct role in the production of knowledge
that exists in a range of arenas – this is absolutely the case for sociology. Kong writes,
“Sociologists can get jobs through only two means: state universities (under the Ministry
of Education) or the Academy of Social Sciences (under Ministry of Propaganda), both of
which are under the ideological control of the government” (Kong 2016: 501). Queer
theory in China, closely guided by the government, once sought to “diagnose” the
“causes” of homosexuality (e.g. 李银河's 《他们的世界》– Li Yinhe's "Their World" –
which investigates the reasons gay men and women "become" gay such as through sexual
encounters in childhood and adolesence (1993)). Recently, however, there is clearly an
increased attention given to analyzing cultural specificities and their influence on and/or
interaction with gay identity. This shift is evident in all of the following: Documenting
non-normative sexualities and the “true” history of (homo)sexuality in China (Kong
2012; 2016), analyzing the ways in which gay individuals mediate personal (culturallycentered) morality and family obligations (赵御辰 2014), compiling data on interpersonal
communications between “masked” and “unmasked” gay individuals (吴维 2015), or
any other aspect covered in the myriad of recent Chinese queer theory studies. In all of
these cases, researchers in this field have the potential to drive discourse and provide
potential solutions on “how” to be gay in China.
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In determining “how” to be gay in China, there is an absolute requirement to
indigenize certain aspects of gay identity. This is not necessarily to the benefit of gays in
China themselves, to whom concepts such as “gay” and “coming out” (“出柜”) are
relatively easy to interpret because of shared struggles experienced by the very nature of
being non-heterosexual (i.e. gays from all cultures experience general alienation from
society and family), (although this research is certainly useful to gays as well), but it is
especially to the benefit of heterosexual society in that the challenges faced by gays are
made intelligible in the context of Chinese culture. This is evident in the parallels
between sociological/anthropological researchers from a range of backgrounds who
suggest there are “differences” in “being gay” across different cultures and the language
used by native Chinese researchers on homosexuality in China.
A key example of this is “coming out”. Within Chinese gay communities, “出
柜” (literally leave-closet) is by far the most ubiquitous phrase used to describe the
process of “publicizing” or “actively recognizing” one’s homosexuality (《奇葩说》
2015; 知乎). Yet, sociologists who study homosexuality in China repeatedly suggest that,
despite often using the same phrases, the meanings attached between Western and
Chinese cultures are simply not the same (Chou 2001; Martin 2007). Following Chinese
queer theory and sociology’s recent shift, studies produced on homosexuality by native,
often non-international Chinese researchers reproduce those theoretical differences in a
range of ways. I provide evidence of the correlation between these “theoretical”
differences and “experienced” differences with two recent sociological studies on
homosexuality in China:
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The first study is “家庭视角下中国同性恋者缔结异性婚姻的伦理探求”
(“Ethical Exploration of Heterosexual Marriage by Chinese Homosexuals from the
Perspective of Family”) (赵御辰 2014). It is concerned with how modern gay men in
China mediate “ethics” or “morality” (“伦理,” a phrase that, notably, also appears on
the homophobic banner waved at Huazhong University stating “维护中华民族传统伦
理” – “Protect Chinese traditional morality”) in facing the specter of fake marriage,
either with a heterosexual woman or with a lesbian woman, because of family pressure.
赵御辰’s research makes a distinctive appeal to “伦理,” a concept which can
technically be directly translated into the English language – “ethics” or “morality” – but
does not smoothly retain its meaning unless there is a mutual understanding of the
cultural context in which it takes on that meaning (曾仕强 2004). Considering the impact
of “伦理” means taking an affective route to understanding the myriad ways in which
Chinese gays make sense of their conundrum; it suggests a multidimensional and
interactive approach to a topic that is typically rendered unidimensional and linear by the
eurocentric assessment that “different choices” equates to “different levels of
individualism” (and thus “different levels of
freedom/oppression/happiness(/Westernization)”); it rejects the claim that such a
eurocentric assessment is sufficient in “explaining” any and all non-Western sociocultural shifts.
The second study is “隐匿与显现：J 市男同性恋者社会互动研究” (“Hidden
and Visible: A Gay Social Interaction Study in J[ilin] City”) (吴维 2015). In their
assessment of interpersonal communications, 吴维 “replaces” the Western-imported
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“out”/”closeted” binaric imagery with a binary that is culturally-connotated: “隐匿”
(“hidden” or “masked”) and “显现” (“visible” or “unmasked”). In doing so, the
imagery of the closet, which is rooted in Western cultural and historical context (i.e. the
clear and distinct separation of public and private spheres and the positioning of sexuality
as a “hidden truth” that can be “unlocked”) is replaced by imagery that carries culturallyintelligible connotations of “shame” versus “status” and “social enactment” (Martin
2007: 203-4). This kind of imagery corresponds with central concepts of Chinese culture
such as “面子” (mianzi, “face”), concepts which continue to deeply pervade Chinese
society despite the so-called “massive upheaval” of culture implicated in neoliberal
capitalist development.
Some (Westerners) might (understandably) find it difficult to conceptualize how
exactly the tropes of “closet” and “mask” differ from each other while still describing a
similar phenomenon. Indeed, Fran Martin, who proposes a “隐”/”显” binary
(which contains the same characters as 吴维’s “隐匿”/“显现” binary), also admits
that there is a degree of similitude between the two concepts, but suggests that, instead of
focusing attention towards their perceived similarities, “More productive questions are
about how ‘the mask’ works to produce knowledges of tongxinglian [homosexuality] in
its specific, situated developments” (2007: 204).
As such, it is important to consider that heterosexual Chinese society, despite
sharing a (supposedly) “separate” sexuality from its homosexual communities, is much
more capable of intelligibility and empathetic understanding towards concepts that arise
indigenously and are situated in a relevant (often localized) cultural context, rather than
imported concepts that rely on a shared struggle in producing cross-cultural intelligibility.
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As such, production of localized, indigenized vocabulary and concepts, especially in
developing fields like sociology and queer theory, will without doubt be incredibly useful
tools in combating social and structural “homophobia” in China, homophobia which is
primarily directed at its perceived “non-Chineseness” rather than some (socially,
historically, and culturally constructed) “inherent evil/inferiority”.
Conclusion
Ultimately, I have found that the challenges being faced by Chinese gays are
experienced in a range of ways and are mediated and navigated by a range of methods.
There appear to be more and more opportunities for Chinese gays to integrate same-sex
relationships into the family, even in families that “disapprove” of homosexuality. If
integration methods fail, capitalist developments have provided ways for Chinese gays to
negotiate family pressures and sexual desires, especially through mobilization, economic
independence, and suzhi cultivation.
Despite this image of China as growingly cosmopolitan, an image which is
commonly reproduced in virtual gay communities, the specter of fake marriages are still a
reality for many gay men, even for those who have opportunities to mobilize but refuse to
do so. Addressing the issue of fake marriage, not of a lack of pride parades or legislative
equality, is at the forefront of concerns within the gay community.
Although the image of the Chinese government in relation to gay rights often
appears unclear, oppressive, or nonsensical, as it seems to “randomly” support or deny
privileges to Chinese gays, I do believe there is a greater focus that can be used to
understand this supposed randomness. It may entirely be possible that the government is
“hatefully” “homophobic” towards Chinese gays, but I have also shown how specific
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instances of this homophobic legislation also contains cultural preservation efforts or
other elements of fear about China’s “moral erosion,” especially in the form of family
structure. Despite the presence of homophobic legislation, the recent trends in queer
theory and sociology, which have been guided by the government and increasingly deal
with “indigenizing” homosexuality, seem incredibly positive.
Unfortunately, a major research limitation for this thesis has been the noncomprehensive nature of Chinese gay identity expression on Zhihu. First, gays in China
who successfully integrate into the family unit typically would not go to Zhihu in seeking
advice on homosexuality – thus, it is mostly frequented by those who have already been
alienated by family/friends/society. Second, the very act of browsing such a niche
webpage implies a certain degree of class, education, and Internet-savviness. Third, the
upvote/downvote system produces a “mob mentality” that regulates and restricts the
visibility of certain ideologies, e.g. comments that even hint at the acceptability of
"outdated" concepts such as xinghun or even indirectly suggest that coming out to one’s
parents might not always be the best option are often shoved to the bottom. Finally, there
is a degree of romanticization of Western “sexual equality” that is perpetuated on these
websites and may not exist in offline communities.
The horizon of future research, however, is quite bright. First, as queer theorists
(and, by extension, the government) further research gay identity in China, a wider range
of voices could emerge that have previously been silenced at places such as Zhihu.
Second, indigenization of homosexuality to Chinese culture could help make the
challenges faced by gays in China more intelligible to mainstream heterosexual society.
Third, a topic totally unmentioned until now because of its newness, as the technology of

Lynam 54

childbirth continues to develop and proliferate, such as in vitro fertilization, integration of
same-sex relationships into the traditional family system could be made much easier.
While I no longer necessarily envision a future of China that contains replication of
Western themes such as rainbow flags, gay pride parades, and “uncloseted”
homosexuality, I do see a future in which gays have a valid place in China.
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